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DECODER WITH NILAY PATEL · THE VERGE

Jensen Huang is out. What did China want from him?

A national security scandal around Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang and an alleged Chinese spy sharpens the fight over artificial intelligence chip exports. China’s push for self-sufficient semiconductors collides with America’s competing visions of artificial intelligence supremacy, economic diffusion and industrial policy.

41m / November 12, 2026 /aipoliticsbusiness / Transcript sourced from openai
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The Story

Nilay Patel recorded this Decoder episode with Kyle Chan, a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution's John L. Thornton China Center, two days before Jensen Huang resigned as Nvidia's CEO. The resignation came as reporting spread about Huang's affairs, including one with an alleged Chinese intelligence asset, and Patel rewrote the intro minutes before publishing. When they spoke, neither man knew how it would end.

The figure at the center is Alex Wang, an executive at Megaspeed, an Nvidia customer that builds data centers in Malaysia. Chan is careful to separate fact from allegation. U.S. intelligence reportedly believes Wang may be working for Chinese intelligence, and Megaspeed might be a back channel for Chinese AI companies to get Nvidia's top Blackwell chips despite export controls.

Patel keeps pressing on motive. Huang doesn't design the chips, so why get close to him? Chan offers two answers. One is visibility into U.S. policymaking, since Trump apparently calls Huang directly on his cell phone. The other is influence over export controls. Chan admits the story doesn't quite add up, because Huang was already lobbying for looser controls out of plain business interest. Beijing may simply have wanted a window into something it didn't understand.

Then there's the stalled investigation. Patel cites New York Times reporting that intelligence agencies flagged the issue a year ago. The Commerce Department spent months on Megaspeed, until Nvidia's general counsel emailed an undersecretary and the case moved to the Justice Department, where it stopped. Chan calls this the most troubling part of the whole affair. He says Nvidia has to cooperate fully with the congressional investigation that incoming Democrats seem likely to open.

His most counterintuitive point is that Beijing may have hurt itself. The loudest American voice for selling chips to China is now tainted, and China hawks have fresh ammunition.

Main Themes

The deepest idea is that the U.S. and China are running different races. Chan says Beijing sees the American pursuit of artificial general intelligence (AGI) as something close to a bubble. China cares more about spreading good-enough AI, especially open-source models, throughout its economy, above all in manufacturing. Patel thinks that's the saner goal and mocks American labs for chasing "digital Jesus." Chan sees a split inside the U.S. as well, between lab culture and ordinary people wondering why giant data centers are going up nearby.

Huang's personal weight is a second thread. Chan calls him a market maker whose offhand remarks move stock prices, and the strongest counterweight to AGI-focused leaders like Dario Amodei and Sam Altman. Without him, Nvidia's habit of recycling its profits into neoclouds (smaller cloud providers that rent out GPUs) and AI startups may lose its public face.

Chan also pushes back on the Silicon Valley image of China as a disciplined, long-term planner. In his telling, the system is messy and corrupt, full of turf wars, with local governments regularly misreading Beijing. Technology transfer runs both ways, as it did with Apple and Tesla. Going forward, he's watching the congressional investigation, pending export control bills, and whether China answers tighter restrictions with its own controls on rare earths.

The funny thing is, China doesn’t see this AI race as being so much about the frontier per se; they’re really much more focused on diffusing the technology. — From the episode

Full Transcript

Source: openai 41m runtime

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Support for the show comes from ElevenLabs. Eleven Agents is a platform for AI voice and chat agents that can actually listen, understand, and resolve customer issues. If you run a business or handle customer operations across support, sales, or marketing, you can start with a demo at elevenlabs.io slash decoder. See how Eleven Agents can fit into your workflows and help build experiences that your customers will actually love. elevenlabs.io slash decoder, spelled E-L-E-V-E-N L-A-B-S dot io slash decoder. Hello and welcome to Decoder. I'm Nilay Patel, editor-in-chief of The Verge, and Decoder is my show about big ideas and other problems. Today we're talking about the Jensen Wang scandal at Nvidia, which is developing so quickly that we had to do an emergency update of this intro minutes before publishing this episode. Jensen just resigned from his position as CEO of Nvidia as news of his affairs, including with an alleged Chinese spy, threatened to engulf the company. We'll obviously have more on that story as things develop and we learn how Nvidia will restructure itself after Jensen. He had something like 60 direct reports, after all, and the entire AI financial ecosystem flows through his company. This is pure Decoder bait. But just two days ago, I talked to Kyle Chan, a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution's John L. Thornton China Center, about the real heart of the scandal. What would China even seek to accomplish by having a spy so close to Jensen? And what does the real state of the U.S.-China AI conflict look like, particularly from the Chinese point of view? Kyle's answers about chips and how China looks at the so-called AI race were particularly illuminating. But maybe even more interesting was his observation that Jensen Wang's relationship with Trump was the most important thing of all, because maybe what China most stands to gain is someone to whisper in the right ears. We're going to just dive right into it, but keep in mind, when Kyle and I were talking, we still didn't know what would happen with Jensen. Okay, Kyle Chan on Nvidia, China, and the future of AI export controls. Here we go. Kyle Chan, you are a fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Welcome to Decoder. Great to be here. What on earth could we be talking about as it relates to your expertise about China today? I have a lot to ask you about Nvidia, about our relationship to China as a country, as an economy, about national security. Let's start at the very beginning. From all the reporting we have today, it seems like the United States government has been very worried about Alex Wang and Megaspeed, the alleged Chinese spy at the center of the swirling scandal around Jensen Wang, the CEO of Nvidia. What do we know about Alex Wang and Megaspeed? So, so far, we have to be sort of careful about what we know and what we don't know. So far, there are allegations that the U.S. intelligence community believes that Aleswang may be an asset of the Chinese intelligence services. And Megaspeed itself is a customer of Nvidia's, and they build a data center like in Malaysia. And they also seem to potentially have ties with Chinese companies and could, and this is where we're getting into the, you know, what we do know and what we don't know, but could potentially be a conduit for Chinese AI companies accessing cutting-edge Nvidia chips like Blackwells. I want to rewind way back. The notion that the Chinese AI industry wants Nvidia chips has been floating around for years, and the idea that the Chinese AI industry would somehow develop a parallel set of technology or superior set of technology because of the constraint of not having Nvidia chips has percolated into the discourse several times. I'm particularly thinking about DeepSeek, right? DeepSeek launches R1. It, like, outperforms our models in some ways. We think they didn't have access to the chips. There's some accusations they had access to the chips. It turns out they did a bunch of fine-tuning on the chips they did have. What is that relationship like? Do they need the highest-end Nvidia chips? Is it true that they're actually developing parallel technologies that might be superior on the chips they can have? Just set that stage. A lot of the details are murky, and they're probably murky for a reason. But up until now, we see Chinese AI companies that were dependent very heavily on Nvidia chips in order to train and run their models for a long time. And in fact, they became some of the biggest contributors to the CUDA ecosystem, sort of Nvidia's software ecosystem platform. And they got very good at that. But at the same time, with U.S. export controls and greater technology restrictions on access to cutting-edge GPUs, China increasingly pushed these AI companies to switch away from Nvidia to Huawei and other domestic AI chip makers. And the idea there is to develop a parallel domestic AI chip supply chain that is good enough, if not, you know, on par with Nvidia's latest chips, and crucially, resilient to policy actions coming out of Washington. So that is the story up until this point. And the question is now, what is that trajectory for the Chinese GPU or AI chip development? Yeah. The reason I wanted to start there. Is the incentives or the motivations to get close to Jensen Huang are very murky to me, right? Like the CEO of Nvidia, I understand that everyone thinks he's the character. He's actually, like, in the software designing the next generation of Nvidia GPUs. But he's just, like, traveling the world giving policy speeches. If you want to build a parallel GPU ecosystem, you're trying to get close to the designers and the engineers, right? What would be the goal of trying to get close to Jensen Huang? Yeah, I see what your question is getting at. So if you wanted, like, the design specs for the latest Nvidia GPUs, I don't know if you would ask Jensen directly. I think you might want to go to his technical staff, right? He does have, like, 60 direct reports. Like, Decoder is often a show about org charts, and, like, that one has been on top of my list for a long time. But we'll set that aside for now. Keep going. Right. So I think instead what it's really about is potentially two things. One is trying to understand, maybe glean information about the U.S. policy-making process, right? Jensen Huang is very close to Trump. They talk a lot. Trump can apparently just call Jensen on his cell phone at any moment. In the middle of a conference, we've seen the video. Yep. And then on the other side, and maybe this is even the bigger issue, perhaps it's the biggest concern of all, is the concern that the direction of movement could run the other way, which is that somehow through Jensen, China might be able to influence U.S. policy-making, especially on export controls. That is the big worry, I think, from a lot of people in Washington. One of the other underlying concerns here that I'm just trying to parse out is that Alex Wang, the alleged Chinese spy, is an executive at a company called Megaspeed. And through Megaspeed, Nvidia may have already been circumventing export controls. It seems like if you're already solving the problem, maybe you should just leave it alone. Like, how does that dynamic play out? That's right. So a lot of the story is strange, even seen in sort of the most cynical terms. It doesn't quite add up. So I think there could be several different possibilities. One is that this is actually not some, like, concerted strategy from Beijing to try to obtain chips or information or influence, but this is potentially Beijing not quite understanding the full situation and wanting to kind of co-opt this Alice Wong person into at least trying to understand from her standpoint what is happening. Because I think you're right. Already, you have a very strong relationship between Nvidia and Megaspeed. You also already have, you know, this is on the influence side, you already have Jensen Huang advocating for his own sort of commercial interests for a loosening of export controls on his own chips to China. So you don't really need Beijing to kind of, like, push on that gas pedal. That's sort of already happening. So, yeah, there's some things that don't quite make sense if you're thinking about it from those standpoints. But if you're thinking about it from a Beijing wants visibility, perhaps maybe that is another plausible explanation. Beijing just wants someone who Trump calls on the phone to advocate for their viewpoints. Like, I see all of that, but what are we getting out of it? If the goal is Nvidia chips, it feels like that is already assured. If the goal is Nvidia engineering plans, that feels like a question mark. If the goal is influence over the Trump administration, I feel like they could have just bought cryptocurrency. That's right. Like, there's, like, a big swirl of, like, what is actually happening here. Maybe your point that Beijing just needed more visibility because it is a swirl is the motivating factor. The question that leads me to is that, you know, the New York Times reports U.S. intelligence agencies first flagged these issues a year ago. To the Trump administration, there's a memo from Marco Rubio. The reporting is that he oversaw the memo, which is as much plausible deniability as anybody. He oversaw it. He was aware that there was a memo. A year ago, the United States national security apparatus is worried about Alex Wong at Megaspeed, the relationship with Jensen, and nothing occurred. What do you make of that? That is one of the most worrying aspects of all this. Regardless of what the details are and, you know, what is known publicly versus what our intelligence community knows, this is something that should be investigated. This is obviously a major national security issue, and this is something where you don't want someone meddling with this process. You want to do a full investigation, get to the bottom of what's happening. And I think what we're seeing from some of the reporting is that this has been known, and in fact, if anything, there may have been efforts to try to stop this investigation or distort it in some way. So I think that is very troubling from that sort of internal, within the U.S. government perspective. There's a lot going on with Nvidia in that part of the story, right, where Nvidia's own spokespeople are saying there's nothing going on here. This is a normal relationship. On the record to many publications. A week later, Jensen issues his apology letter saying there was a relationship. That's not great for John Rizzo, Nvidia's comms person. Tim Teter, Nvidia's general counsel, is out there saying everything is above board. Now we know not everything is above board. What do you make of Nvidia's corporate governance here? Because there's a whole bunch of shareholder lawsuits to come. There's one filed as of today. I can only imagine there are more to come. Nvidia has to tread very carefully here because what you don't want is exactly what's sort of already happening, which is to start to deny or at least start to dismiss some of these issues and then turn around and have to say, actually, it may be there might be something there. And I think this is especially important now as there are growing calls for a congressional investigation, right? So this is going to be separate perhaps from sort of within the executive branch where, again, I think we have reasons to worry about conflicts of interest, people not wanting to sort of do this all the way. But if there's a full-blown congressional investigation, that might reveal some things that if you are Nvidia, you want to get out in front of rather than have to sort of backpedal later on and sort of explain yourself. Part of the back and forth here with the government's concern about Alex Wang and Megaspeed is that the Commerce Department spent months looking at the company, and then Teter, the general counsel of Nvidia, emailed them, invoked a direct relationship with the undersecretary. That got the case kicked to the DOJ where everything stopped. Trump yesterday said the FBI is investigating. That's obviously connected to the DOJ. There's just a universe where the Trump administration is trying to make this go away, right? Nvidia can pressure the Trump administration to make this go away, that reeks of corruption, obviously. And then you have a very empowered class of Democrats coming into Congress. With polling that suggested corruption was one of the top issues in this last election, I don't see any outcome except those Democrats, an empowered bunch of investigators, an empowered bunch of committee chairs, coming after Nvidia as hard as they can. How should the company think about that? Should they put them in front of Congress every day for the next year? How do you think that's going to play out? At the most fundamental level, they need to cooperate and comply with calls from Congress to carry out this full investigation. Because up until now, I think the reason why this has all been so murky, I think part of the reason why there's this kind of been a stop and go, even though those of us in the sort of China AI space have been hearing about this for a while, right? So, like companies like Megaspeed, their role in all this, even people like Alex Wang have been flagged much earlier than this. And the fact that I think that this is coming out now, but that the investigation was kind of like stop and started within the Trump administration, that is a big red flag. So I think ultimately, from Nvidia's standpoint, they're going to have to come clean with whatever Congress now requests. And I think there's going to be a lot of hard questions from Congress, as there should be, that have been building up for some time now. Support for the show comes from CrowdStrike. AI is already fundamentally changing how companies build products and run their businesses. 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It is better for the Chinese AI industry to be dependent on CUDA and dependent on NVIDIA chips, because then if we do get into some conflict, maybe you can restrict that access and you will set them back, right? Like there's some swirl of argument that he makes that says it's in the United States' national security interest to ship as many NVIDIA GPUs to China as you can. Then there's a lot of China hawks who are like, actually, you need to restrain them, keep them years behind. They will not catch up to our bleeding-edge technology. Jensen, you just keep us ahead. It feels like out of all of this, the China hawks are gonna start winning more fights than they're losing, right? That the Chinese government is actively trying to impede our efforts, are actively trying to influence our government. How should people think about that? Like, what framework should we use to evaluate that swirl of differing opinions, especially now that there's a catalyst for some kind of change? I think that's the right way to kind of frame up this whole debate. You have, on the one hand, folks who see the U.S.-China AI competition as a critical strategic competition, and access to compute is one of the key levers there, and thus U.S. export controls, not only as they stand now, but tightening them further, will be critical to maintaining the U.S. edge in this, you know, in the most powerful technology of our lives. Then there are other people who are on the opposite camp who advocate for greater exports of the U.S. AI tech stack writ large, including Nvidia chips and including to China. And up until now, that camp has been led by people like Howard Lutnick, Jensen Huang, and Trump himself. And I think what's interesting is the balance of power in terms of whose argument gets more weight has been shifting and will shift in light of this recent controversy. So here now, those who have been advocating for more exports and fewer export controls, some of their arguments have been tainted by this process, potentially, regardless of where the investigation goes. And then there's a final variable, actually, in all this, which is China itself. And that's something that matters a lot in this discussion because in the background, China is doing two things. One, they're trying to build their own chips, right? And they're sort of all in on building a resilient semiconductor supply chain with their own, say, Huawei AI chips that their own AI companies can use. They will never really catch up. It looks highly unlikely, but they could develop good enough chips to replace the Nvidia ones that they have been dependent on for so long. And the second big factor from China is retaliation. And this is one thing that I'm watching very closely, which is if these greater export controls are placed by the U.S. on not just chips to China, but on chip-making equipment, the tools required to make the semiconductors themselves, will China use its own export controls, such as on rare earths, to hit back? Right. And this is in the context of an ongoing trade and tariff war that has rocked the United States economy. Like, in many ways, the first thing that Democrats should do when they enter the next Congress is pass a law getting rid of all the Trump tariffs, right? They are brought into Congress to fix affordability, and the tariffs are an affordability problem. And now we're going to rush into a trade war with China because we might ask the Dutch government to restrict ASML chip-making machines, right? And that seems very fraught, right, to say, actually, we need to enter into an even more heated AI war with China that might result in the Chinese government placing export controls on the goods that you already find unaffordable. Do you think that there's, like, the political will to go through this whole exercise, or is it just to punish Nvidia and Jensen Huang? At this point, honestly, I think in some ways this is happening against the backdrop of other issues that are probably more top of mind for both voters and for incoming legislators in the Capitol. Things like cost of living, as you point out, tariffs, trying to investigate the whole Trump administration more broadly for corruption and other issues. Somewhere in there is also the debate around data centers and AI itself. But there's another world where if there are issues that come up, I mean, that could be potentially disruptive not just for Nvidia, not just for the U.S.-China relationship, but for the AI boom in the U.S. overall. Tell me more about China itself. You mentioned maybe that their chips will get good enough. I think there's an argument that the frontier models we have today are actually good enough to disrupt the economy, right? They're certainly good enough to disrupt the field of mathematics. You could stop training new models and just let the technology diffuse, and you would still disrupt huge swaths of the economy today. Like, we're nowhere close to that actually happening. I think the AI labs should prove that they can do it with the technology they have today. That's for another time. But— China doesn't need to compete at the frontier to gain the productivity advantages, to gain the industrial advantages. The example I keep using is 5G. Like, I was told for a decade that we had to win the race to 5G, otherwise China would do something, and no one would ever tell me what the something was. What is the something with AI that China will defeat us at that has made this such a critical geopolitical chess match? And is there a point where it will just be good enough for them to achieve the something? The funny thing is, China doesn't see this AI race as being so much about the frontier per se. They're really much more focused on diffusing the technology, and they think they can win, quote unquote, win the AI race by just having AI used much more broadly, integrated throughout the economy, especially in areas like manufacturing where they are already sort of like the behemoth. And I think when they see the sort of discussion around, like, getting to AGI, certainly from the government standpoint in Beijing, like, that to them looks kind of like a bubble, a waste of money. Why are you building sort of all that compute for that? So I think what's interesting to see is the strategy as they've been playing it out is one where they're trying to not fall too far behind the U.S., but really focus a lot more on trying to get especially these open-source models out there across the Chinese economy and globally as well. And to that extent, on that metric, they seem to be doing pretty well. That to me always has seemed like the real fight, right? Anthropic and OpenAI are furious that the Chinese companies are constantly distilling their models. They're trying to build some technology to keep them from distilling their models. But if you believe in the promise of AI and what it can do to the economy, your emphasis should be on diffusing good enough models, not AGI. Whereas our emphasis, do the way our market works, is a bunch of guys who think they're going to build digital Jesus. Like, whatever is going to happen, that's the thing they want. And Dario Amodei has to pretend that he cares about Salesforce, but we know what his real priority is. How do the United States and China compete in that dynamic, right, where you have one very managed economy that is set a much more near-term and potentially achievable goal, and then, you know, our market system, where the incentives of the leading market players have nothing to do with the economic incentives of the rest of us? And there's even a sort of ideological foundation to all of this, because the vision of AGI is one that is, like, so deeply embedded right now in the American AI community and sort of Silicon Valley culture that I think there's a risk of potential disconnect, not just between the U.S. and China on this issue, but within the U.S. between those who are in the labs like Anthropic and those who are outside who are like, Why are we building these giant metal boxes in our backyards? Like, we don't really see the point of this. So there's already that divergence there, and I think part of it is this longstanding obsession in the American sort of AI imagination with getting to the machine god, essentially. Bring that all back to the context of Nvidia, Jensen Huang, Alice Huang, Megaspeed. Megaspeed is a data center provider in Southeast Asia. That's theoretically their business. They're building data centers, they're buying these chips. Shouldn't market forces just end this, right? Like the United States AI companies want to build data centers. They will pay whatever rates because they have an ideological purpose that is disconnected from capitalism, potentially. And, you know, the Chinese government is just trying to diffuse AI into manufacturing, and the United States government would like to hold them back. Shouldn't market forces just mean that you sell the chips to the highest bidder, and the highest bidder will almost always be an American AI company? That's an interesting question, because there is ultimately market demand in China still for these Nvidia chips. And there is a divergence here between the companies in China who still want Nvidia chips, who still want access to them, and the government, who is like, No, no, no. Why don't you try Chinese chips? Why don't you help us with our Chinese domestic chip development? There's that divergence there. And I think what's interesting is players like Megaspeed, sort of in between, could potentially do things like not just allow Chinese AI companies, again, potentially to get access to Nvidia chips, but then the argument some people are making is that those are chips that could have gone to the U.S. AI companies and hyperscalers who are sort of desperate. That is an argument that's out there. But fundamentally, yeah, I don't know how much of this is driven by those sheer commercial interests alone, or again, by some of these policy or ideological divides. Or by the influence of an alleged spy. Right. This is why, because in a pure market environment, I think I know how this goes. But then you obviously have the complicated geopolitical dynamics, and then you have this. corruption element, where both governments are attempting to influence one company at the center of the storm. If you could draw the network diagram of, like, the entire sort of U.S. AI ecosystem, Nvidia would be at the center of that. And if you could draw the diagram of the entire Nvidia ecosystem, like, a single man is, like, standing at the heart of all of that. And the question becomes, if he were no longer the CEO of Nvidia, how much impact would that have on Nvidia's ability to make progress on its own AI chips, and what impact would that have on the rest of the U.S. AI industry? Like, one possibility, for example, is that there is a slowdown in Nvidia's ability to crank out, like, next generation after next generation of better and better chips, and that could impact U.S. overall compute buildout. That is one possibility. Another possibility, though, is that there's just so much demand, and that the knowledge is diffused enough throughout Nvidia that the company can still continue to make progress at a breakneck pace, even without their fearless leader at the top. A lot is unknown. Fearless is the right word, because when I look at Nvidia, again, I don't think Jensen is designing the chips. I know that there's a character he wants to play where he's in all the meetings, and he's probably taking some risk in chip design that is hard for us to see from the outside. But what we can see is Jensen's enormous appetite for risk when it comes to financing neoclouds and investing in frontier AI companies. All of the dollars Nvidia is making flow back out in a circle to the AI ecosystem, and it's unclear to me whether that continues to happen without Jensen specifically being willing to front the risk and show up on CNBC and be the face of the risk and say everything's okay. What do you think happens then? His role as not just a technology leader, but as a market— Market maker is really crucial. Like when he calls out certain companies, like certain startups or neoclouds, you can see their stock prices go up. And when he says something like, I don't know if this quantum thing is going to work out, you suddenly see, like, the entire industry take a hit. That is sort of the weight of his role in the broader ecosystem. Yeah, so going forward, without that kind of advocate and sort of this market maker playing this active role, I think that's another factor beyond the Nvidia chips themselves and the sort of technological role of the company. There is this deeper industry or even sort of like sociological function that Jensen plays and that Nvidia plays in this broader sort of AI buildout. Support for the show comes from Upwork. It takes a surprising number of people with a lot of diverse skills to bring episodes of Decoder to your feed every week. No single person is an expert at all the jobs that need to get done, so we delegate. If your business has reached the stage where you need to start delegating, Upwork can help. Upwork gives your business fast access to highly skilled specialists with deep expertise, so you can fill critical skill gaps, launch projects faster, and scale support up or down without committing to full-time headcount. From software development and AI implementation to marketing, design, and business operations, Upwork helps you hire with confidence and get started quickly. And with Business Plus, you can access the top 1% of talent on Upwork. 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Come back to Firefox. Visit firefox.com to try it yourself. One of the interesting dynamics in all of that is Jensen also doesn't seem to care very much about AGI, right? Like, he thinks it's just software. I've heard him say, This is just software. Like, everybody calm down. These risks are fake. We don't need a safety regime, all this stuff. He's more aligned with what you're describing as the Chinese viewpoint, right, where this is just a tool to accelerate our economy. If he goes, maybe that changes too. Possible, yeah. I mean, he has been one of the most powerful counterweights to the, let's go all in on AGI sort of perspective that you hear from Dario and Sam Altman, for example. So I think without his voice in that process, he's also been a very strong advocate for open source, again emphasizing the diffusion rather than the, say, control and restrictions on cutting-edge AI. I do think if his voice is not there, there would be a pretty big vacuum for folks who would advocate that position or that view. At the same time, though, I think, again, beyond the immediate AI industry in the U.S., I don't know how much that resonates with the broader U.S. public, this sort of race to AGI argument. And I think right now, a lot of people are just more wondering, you know, nuts and bolts: is this technology going to cost me my job tomorrow? You know, is it actually useful? Is it impacting my, you know, university studies? Those are things that maybe are more sort of impactful day to day for most ordinary Americans. Yeah, it is abundantly clear that Jensen is not a great spokesperson to the average consumer in the United States, right? He has not made the sale to them. He's made the sale to a bunch of financiers. You know, like he's made the sale to Wall Street. He's made the sale to the tech industry. But the average American, we can just see from the polling in the election, very, very skeptical of all of this and very, very skeptical of the costs versus the benefits. Again, I'm just putting that in the context of there's an alleged Chinese spy whispering in the ear of this man. What truly would the Chinese government hope to gain from that? Because in one way, they've actually achieved a victory here, right? They've destabilized the American AI economy. But it doesn't seem like that was the goal. Like they're furiously denying that any of this even happened. There is another sort of— Very counterintuitive take, which is they kind of shot themselves in the foot on this one. So from Beijing's perspective, right, they don't want to see more export controls. They might want to see loosening. But now they, because of this, you know, potential Chinese spy, now they've kind of tainted the one man who has been advocating the most for loosening export controls. In some ways now they've, like, taken out someone who had otherwise, for sort of like sheer commercial reasons, been, like, more aligned. And who's going to take that place? And if anything now, it has really charged, especially the Democrats who have been criticizing the Trump administration about, you know, not being tougher on these export controls. It has really galvanized the Democrats on this front and made it more of an issue perhaps than it was before, especially when you connect it to corruption and the AI industry wasting money. It's all there for them. Tell me more broadly about Chinese spying in the AI industry. There was a report, I don't know, a few months ago that OpenAI was warning its employees that spies abound, that if suddenly attractive people appeared, be wary, because they were probably spies. Like, I love that. Like, there's just something about that that's great. Obviously when it hits Jensen, it's a different kind of story, especially with the national security implications and corruption implications. But give us a sense of what the spy trade is like on the ground for the average AI researcher. All I can say here is that they are juicy targets, right? So the U.S. AI labs, anyone who's involved with sort of like cutting-edge frontier AI or AI chip production, chip design, they would be juicy targets for Chinese intelligence gathering because this is something where China is trying to catch up. They're trying to figure out how to keep pace with the U.S. on AI and try to build their own alternatives to Nvidia GPUs. So, and you can see there have been other examples of, like, you know, cases where they've been— Poaching engineers from TSMC in Taiwan or from South Korea and sort of struggle to deal with efforts to hold back this strategic IP, basically. So there's probably a lot more happening under the surface in terms of this cat-and-mouse game. But I do think that they are prime targets, and I think—correct me if I'm wrong—but I think that there have been sort of warnings from the U.S. government to be careful and to step up your game on the cybersecurity front and sort of the intelligence front to protect against these threats. Meanwhile, they're putting all their information into Slack and getting breached on a daily. Who knows if these warnings are taking off? Last set of questions here. I'm thinking about Apple and Tesla, where, you know, we moved our manufacturing to China, we moved our supply chains to China, the Chinese industries, whether it was above board or not—and there's a rich debate you could have on that; we've had it on the show—they learned a lot from our companies. There was technology transfer. That's happening in AI too, right? There are a lot of Chinese AI researchers working in and around these labs. There is technology transfer happening, again, above board or not. Isn't that just the normal course of business, or is there something more nefarious happening here? To some extent, there are sort of people flows, knowledge flows across the—you might not even just think of it in terms of, like, national-level AI communities. You might think about this sort of global diffusion of know-how, tips and tricks for squeezing a bit more performance out of the same amount of compute, right? So up until recently especially, you saw a lot of sharing of, say, papers like the Transformer paper that disseminated new architectural breakthroughs throughout the global AI community. And now that's changing, obviously, as a lot of especially the U.S. companies are holding this much closer to their chest. But yeah, there is this broader— Question about, like, who gets access to this, who sort of gains and loses? I guess it's also not just a one-way flow, right? So some of these American AI companies benefit a lot from having some of these Chinese developers work with them, in the same way Apple and Tesla, right? It wasn't just like they kind of gave away the crown jewels to China, but that China in turn kind of saved these companies, especially at times when they were facing a perilous moment in their histories. So, yeah, there's this bigger question about, like, what is the line between normal commercial and technology flows versus a concerted state-backed effort to obtain sensitive strategic secrets, IP, technology that would have broader geopolitical implications? Does that strategy for China look like a bunch of companies like Megaspeed with allegedly compromised executives, or is it play out more directly? I think actually, if anything, it would be less about the companies like Megaspeed, who seem to be kind of like middlemen for, you know, dealing with compute, and perhaps different companies, different agencies perhaps in the Chinese system that might be more active. So, I mean, at one extreme, you have, like, the outright concerted efforts at industrial espionage, right? So that, you know, there are state-backed actors who are very systematic at trying to obtain some of the best commercial secrets from around the world, including from American companies. But on the other hand, you do also have sort of like this gray zone of, like, well, if a Chinese company acquires a stake in a U.S. or European company, what does that mean? Does that mean they're trying to obtain the technology, or is that like a regular commercial deal? That's where it starts to get more difficult to parse, and you'd have to look at it on a case-by-case basis. One of the dynamics in talking about the Chinese government and United States, especially when you talk to American industrialists, is that the American government is chaos and democracy is messy and everyone's running in 50 different directions. The Chinese system is directed. They make 100-year plans, not one-quarter plans. Like, we've heard it. Everyone knows these clichés. How true is that? Right? Like, in this case alone, it doesn't seem like they achieved the goal of their plan. In many cases, they might have actually set themselves back. Oh, yeah. I mean, for those who actually study China, who have done long-term research on this country and who understand it more closely, it looks like a much messier picture than any of these portrayals, especially from those in Silicon Valley who try to juxtapose China against what they find to be this kind of annoyingly messy and unruly democracy. Like, the Chinese system, both within the government and then across industries and government, is full of conflicting interests, rife with corruption. There are lots of times where you have bureaucratic turf wars that spill out into the open. You have missteps, ones that can backfire profoundly. So you see that all the time. You see the local governments not following what Beijing wants, or following what Beijing wants, but in the wrong direction, right? Sometimes they're given a signal and they're like, Oh, okay, we got to run that way, and then Beijing is like, No, no, no, no, no, other way, other way. So, yeah, this happens all the time. And I think, you know, to anyone in Silicon Valley who's trying to make this neat argument, all I can say is, like, go talk to people in China. They can tell you how messy it is actually on the ground. Kyle, this has been great. What do you think happens next year? What should people be looking out for? I think the biggest thing is a congressional investigation and who's behind that, what that surfaces, and then potentially along with that, these pending bills around export controls and whether those will now get more momentum to pass in Congress, and whether Trump himself, the White House in general, will try to play a role in either stopping that or giving that a quiet green light. I suspect we're going to want to talk to you again as this process plays out. Thank you so much, Kyle, for being on Decoder. Thank you. To get new episodes every Monday and Thursday, subscribe to our YouTube channel at DecoderPod and find us on TikTok and Instagram under @DecoderPod for more fun stuff we put out almost every day. If you enjoy this episode, please send a link to it to someone you think might like it. It really helps us grow the show. You can also subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. Decoder is a production of The Verge and part of the Vox Media Podcast Network. The show’s producers are Greg Ott, Kate Cox, and Nick Statt. This episode was edited by Ursa Wright. Our editorial director is Kevin McShane. The Decoder music is by Breakmaster Cylinder. We’ll see you next time. UKG is the workforce operating platform with unified HR, payroll, and workforce management, built to solve the unique challenges of frontline work. Powered by People First AI and decades of labor data, UKG turns workforce intelligence into real-time decisions around staffing, pay, compliance, and productivity, enabling every worker to confidently take action as work happens. Because when work works, everything works. Learn more at ukg.com/work. UKG, HR, pay, and workforce management. Shop Black Friday appliance savings and get up to an extra $1,250 off select appliance purchases like GE Profile, plus free delivery on appliance purchases of $398 or more. 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