Will Iran Break Trumpism?

Is Trumpism crashing on the shoals of the Iran war? That is what Christopher Caldwell thinks. Caldwell's on the right. He's a contributing editor at the Claremont Review of Books. He's one of these people who's been trying, I think, to define and even craft a coherent Trumpism. But it seems pretty dispirited. He recently wrote a piece in The Spectator magazine titled simply, The End of Trumpism, where he wrote, the attack on Iran is so wildly inconsistent with the wishes of his own base, so diametrically opposed to their reading of the national interest that it is likely to mark the end of Trumpism as a project, the end of Trumpism as a project. It wasn't just Iran that had led Caldwell to that point. It was also Trump's brazen self-dealing, the waves of influence peddling, the sense that this man who was supposed to represent the will of the people in some way was doing something very different. But this has led to a debate on the right. Many noted a very obvious counter-argument. Polls show Trump's base is largely sticking with him. So this gets to a question that I think is important and somehow still unsettled, despite Trump's decade-long dominance of American political life. What is Trumpism? Is there a Trumpism or is there just Donald Trump? Caldwell has also spent a long time writing about right-wing populism in Europe. So he has a set of comparisons for what a program here might look like. And I think that's what he sees coming apart now. So I wanted to ask him why. Caldwell, as I mentioned, is a contributing editor at The Claremont Review of Books. He's also a contributing opinion writer for The New York Times and the author of The Age of Entitlement, America Since the 60s, and Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, Immigration, Islam, and the West. As always, my email, EzraKleinShow@NYTimes.com. Chris Caldwell, welcome to the show. Well, thank you, Ezra. So you just wrote this piece for The Spectator, which created a lot of conversation, called The End of Trumpism. Before we get to why you think it's ending, what do you think Trumpism was or is? Well, it's a good question, because when I talk about Trumpism, I'm not talking about MAGA. I'm not talking about the group of hardcore supporters who will back him whatever he does. You could call them Orthodox Trumpians or something like that. I'm talking about sort of a governing project that has a real chance of changing things and did so by picking up people outside of that kind of hardcore. And it's a hard thing to talk about because Trump is notoriously disinclined to really lay out a governing project in any kind of, let's say, programmatic way. So what was Trumpism? I think that at the heart of Trumpism were a few issues. One of them was inequality. I mean, the sense that the society was unfair. One element of the unfairness was just the working of the global economy, where the people who ran it were advancing and the people who built it at a lower level were falling behind. Another was certain government programs. You could talk about affirmative action. So there was unfairness. I think there were a lot of freedom of speech issues. I think that woke was a big part of what Trumpism was, certainly in his second time around. And I think there were certain cultural issues. Trans, for instance, just to take one. But kind of tying them all together was this issue of war. It's very interesting. I think that in the last 20 years, we've had two presidents whose claim to the presidency was built very largely on their opposition to the Iraq war. And for some reason, it's really very important in our politics. And I think for Trump, it was especially important because as long as the president was committed to not going to war in a major way, there's a kind of a limit to how far you could expect him to take his program. And I think that having gone to war now, the limit is sort of off. So I have a couple of questions about this. So one is, when people try to extract a governing agenda out of Trumpism, there is a tendency to extract their governing agenda out of Trumpism. Is there actually this agenda that can be violated? Or as Donald Trump often says, there's just him. He is MAGA. He is Trumpism. That's why it's got Trump in the name. And the fact that his people follow him where he goes means that he's right about that. Well, a lot of the people who've criticized the piece have said, well, look, Trumpism is not ending because if you poll people who call themselves MAGA about this recent war with Iran, 80 to 90 percent of them say they're all behind it. They really love Trump. The real question is, how big is MAGA? And I think if you look at polls that measure it or the people who've been asking that question for quite a while, like NBC has, it kind of peaked after the election at around 36 percent. So I think that gives him a lot less leeway to, let's just say, feel his base will follow him anywhere. In your essay, you give a different definition of what Trumpism was than you've given here. You describe it as a project of democratic restoration. Yes. What do you mean by that? I don't know that that's different from what I'm describing here. That is part of what I describe here as the inequality problem. There are many dimensions to inequality. As I said, there's the there's the income inequality. There's the influence and things like that. But I think there's also the deep state and this idea at the heart of Trumpism, which sounds a little bit occult, but it's a set of informal powers that kind of wind up claiming governing prerogatives and they sort of replace the literal democracy through which we like to believe we're led. You know, the one man, one vote. So, you know, you have the growing influence of elite universities where, you know, basically everyone on the Supreme Court has gone to, you know, either Harvard or Yale Law Schools. You know, I think you have the role of civil rights law in sort of like circumscribing what people feel they can say and how they feel they can interact. And so I think that Trump sort of, again, this wasn't explicit, but I think that everyone felt it. Trump promised a country in which you'd get the stuff you voted for and not the permanent state. Do you know what I mean? He was sort of promising a return to a sort of a more 19th century state that you can criticize as being based on patronage. But what it means is when you vote for a president, he cleans out the whole, you know, executive branch. And now the government is oriented around your voter's wishes. So you're sounding very disenchanted with Trumpism. Is there a moment when you were more enchanted? You know, if we were sitting here talking about the success of Trumpism and the continuation of it, what story would you be telling me? Yeah, I, you know, I don't, I really try not to be enchanted or disenchanted with any politician. It's not a good way to look at things if you have to write about it. You know, I think there are certain really promising things that he did in terms of his own agenda where he seemed to be really delivering to those who voted for him. And, you know, one is that whole series of executive orders that sort of took apart the DEI state and sort of removed affirmative action from American life. I think were very, they really brought a palpable change in the lives of the people who voted for him. Although it was a change. It was an absence. And you don't notice when you go from a presence to an absence the way you do. What was the palpable change that they brought? What was the palpable change? Yeah, you're saying in the lives of the people who voted for him. It's just like less, there's just less talk about, there was less talk about, you know, ethnic categories, gender, that sort of thing, the culture of the country, I think. I think it changed quite a lot. You know what I mean? That I think is part of it. I do a bit, although I guess it's interesting for me to hear you describe it in terms of inequality. Because here you have a president with billions of dollars whose major signature legislative achievements are very unpopular tax cuts that redistributed money upwards, who was elected with the help of the world's richest man, Elon Musk, who seems to, you note this in your piece, be enriching himself rapidly to the tune of, you know, in one count, I've seen over a billion dollars and another count, billions of dollars since being in office. And also seems to exist to many as a response to efforts at equality. You have a dimmer view of efforts at diversity, inequity and inclusion than I do. But when you say wokeness was a big part of it, the sense that there was a progressive push to rectify old inequalities. And Trump came in and said, we're going to stop all that and has been, I will say, very successful at stopping that. That this question then of what is inequality and who is it harming, but also is Trump an agent of it or is he an agent against it, seems at least contestable. Oh, absolutely. I mean, you know, he wouldn't be the first populist who's been rich. And many populists have got rich practicing populism as well. It's a good business. Yes, it's a good business. I agree that there's been something in the second term that's a change of emphasis. And I would agree that it's hurting him. I mean, you, if, I don't know if you saw the Kennedy Center press conference that Tammany-type democracy, but big mass movement type democracy, which had maybe less in the way of sort of individual rights than we have, but a lot more in the way of popular will. So then why, to you, is Iran such a particular threat to this vision of Trumpism? You write in this piece, the attack on Iran is so wildly inconsistent with the wishes of his own base, so diametrically opposed to their reading of the national interest, that it is likely to mark the end of Trumpism as a project. You've already mentioned that in polls, at least, what we might describe as a base is not breaking over this. If you look at overall Trump approval polling, if you did not know there was a war in Iran, you would not know something unusual was happening. He's at about 40% now in the New York Times average. He was at 41% a little bit ago. So what about this, to you, is such a rupture? I think that the promise of no wars was a sort of a kind of a ruling out. And Trump has a particular need to make this as a campaign promise, you know? I mean, there are certain things that you have to commit to not doing. So I think that people thought that, yeah, he's gonna do a lot of crazy stuff. I think people know him, but he's not gonna do that. He's not going to bring the country into a war lasting years, you know? There are limits somewhere. But once he does that, once he turns around and does that, then your sense of the limits is gone. And in suddenly being a Trump supporter is a whole different proposition. So one thing that that brings up is who the base is. And you'd mentioned before this distinction you're making between the people who will follow Trump anywhere and the people who maybe represent the way Trump's appeal or his coalition was expanding into something that had enduring majority potential. And so you wrote that, quote, Those with claims to speak for Trumpism, Joe Rogan, Tucker Carlson, Megyn Kelly, have reacted to the invasion with incredulity. Tell me about why you see those three as avatars of Trumpism. I don't know that there's anything particularly qualitative about them. They're just really famous. Which actually, in a weird way, does reflect something about Trumpism. Oh, well, I don't know. I mean, it's just sort of like, you know, I was just struck by the way all three of them were saying, like, I can't believe it. I mean, incredulity is really what I meant. Well, maybe let me suggest something that I thought about when reading that and trying to think through it, because many in the Republican Party are perfectly comfortable with this move by Donald Trump. And if you go and watch Fox News, and Donald Trump is a big Fox News watcher, Fox News has been, I would say, beating the shield for a war with Iran for a very long time. Whether they started there as Joe Rogan did or ended up there as Megyn Kelly did or got further along there as Tucker Carlson did, all three of those people are very anti-institutional figures. Their politics have become very, very skeptical of what you call the deep state and institutions in American life more broadly. And a lot of the angriest and most unnerved commentary from the right towards Trump has been this feeling of, has taken the form, at least, of, wait, who's really in charge here? And so it feels to me like there's this question of, does Donald Trump now represent the institutions? And as such, what he does is fine because he leads the institutions. Or is there still a lingering sense that Trump himself can be turned by the institutions, talked into something by Benjamin Netanyahu and Lindsey Graham, and as such, now even Trump himself cannot be fully trusted? Oh, I don't know. I don't think any of those people has really turned on Trump, but I could be mistaken. I mean, I don't think it's brought a wholesale distrust of him on their part, I think, but they are incredulous about the Iran war. But why, then, do you think they're incredulous about it? I don't really know. I feel like you're offering a softer critique here than in your piece. You do. I do. I think the idea that this was going to break Trumpism is a pretty bold claim. So your thing is just that the cost of the war will get higher over time? No, did I say the cost would get higher over time? I think there's a lot in my piece. I don't really understand how this is softer. There's other things that I say in the piece about self-enrichment and kleptocracy and that type of rule in the piece. Tell me a bit about that set of arguments and how they relate to this broader concern. So you have the—You know, it has again to do with our populism, progressivism thing. I mean, one thing that progressivism does is it protects these offices against certain kind of malfeasance. So what did we do before progressivism? We only elected people of really sterling moral character. You were supposed to be a worthy inheritor to what Abraham Lincoln was and that sort of thing. It didn't always work, right? We got people like Warren Harding. But that was one thing. And the other thing was, there were elements of the Constitution that you had to follow. That is, you had to nominate people for positions in a certain way and they had to be checked out by the Senate. None of that is happening with Trump. And with the Iran war, we get a really clear sense of what the problems with that can be, because it seems to me that a great deal of the preparation for the war was done by Trump's son-in-law and by one of Trump's close business associates, both of which have a lot of business dealings in the Middle East and others that are at least potentially compromising, such as with crypto and that sort of thing. The point you make that has, I think, been interestingly undercovered in the conversation. There's a lot of focus on the role of Israel, and I think quite understandably because they're the other main partner in the attack. But there's quite a bit of reporting, including new reporting by the Times, that Saudi Arabia has been pushing for this. And broadly speaking, you note that there has been a lot of investment from the Gulf states into Trump-related enterprises. Saudi Arabia investing in Jared Kushner's fund, the UAE and others putting a lot of money into Trump-related crypto projects. Now, it's not at all clear to me all the Gulf states wanted this war in the way that they got it. And in fact, many of them are suffering quite badly inside of it. But the question of who is wielding influence and how has, I think, become, among other things, at the very least, opaque. Yeah. And that's like, if they're just sitting around enriching themselves, that's probably a problem that the people who really wanted to see a change in American life can put up with. But if it goes so far as bringing the country into a war, it might be giving too much responsibility to people who've been brought to power in such an irregular way. I guess one then explanation that would cut through some of this is simply to say Trump is a decider, and this is what he wants. So the conservative writer Matthew Schmidt has put together this long list of Trump quotes on Iran. And I was actually surprised by the specificity of some of these. So in 1988, Trump told The Guardian, I'd be harsh on Iran. They've been beating us psychologically, making us look a bunch of fools. One bullet shot at one of our men or ships, and I do a number on Karg Island. So I probably would not have guessed Trump was talking about Karg Island in 1988. Most people weren't. But I think this gets to a bigger question about Trump, which is the way you just put it a second ago. You elect this guy and he's the boss, unrestrained by the bureaucracy, the process of factions, unrestrained by going to Congress for a declaration of war or the U.N. for a Security Council resolution. I'm not talking about that kind of lack of restraint. When I say he's the boss, I mean, this is the missing piece, maybe, that voters didn't see, okay? That they expected him to be a boss within constitutional limits, you see? And you feel that's what they're not getting from him, that they actually would have wanted him to go to Congress just to slow things down, to make sure things got worked through? I don't know if to slow things. I don't think they wanted this war. I think until he gives them an explanation of what the war is for, it's kind of unlikely that their support for it is going to grow. But I think with Trump, he always framed himself so much as the boss. his distaste for his impatience with the processes and the niceties, his desire. I mean, certainly from the more liberal or progressive standpoint, the idea that Trump wanted to be a ruler, wanted to be a strongman, envied in some ways what Putin or Xi could do, has been a standard issue view of him. I'm not sure I accept it. I'm not sure I accept that progressive view of Trump as a sort of, I don't really know that there's like a populist template into which you can fit Putin and Xi and Trump. They're about specific things. I mean, Xi is a son of a Chinese Maoist revolutionary who was badly treated and he has a lot to prove. He's a builder. And Putin is a guy who rose through the bureaucracy of a defeated and humiliated country and sort of like wants to restore something of that greatness to it. And Trump is a person with just a tremendous ego who kind of blossomed in New York in the 1980s. I think Conversation or the direction of the country. It really had nothing to do with thinking that he symbolizes something Democratic for the whole country, although I think he probably does for his followers. You've described Trump as a populist. I think the Democratic view of Trump is he's a wannabe authoritarian posing as a populist. I'm curious what you think of that. He's certainly shown more of that affect lately, but he's so shaped by a totally different industry than politics that I have a hard time seeing it. And in fact, I'm always struck looking at Trump by the way a lot of his actions are not those of a rulemaker, but those of a guy who still thinks that the rules are actually being made somewhere else and that he needs to get something out of it. Like, I'm going to get something out of the UAE on this deal. I'm going to get something out of Qatar. It's going to, you can sell it as saving the country money, but it's going to get me a plane and things like. It's not. He, he often seems more like someone wringing concessions out of someone than like someone ordering things, someone around. I think there's some truth to that, that more than he wants to engage in a structured, deliberate effort to cohere power around him, he wants to have people paying him tribute. He sort of acts like he has more power than he has, but in acting that way, he's able to wring a lot out of the system, out of, you know, people who might be engaging in business deals, at least with his family around him and from and from other countries in the way he has pursued his tariffs. He's not setting up a bunch of complex bilateral trade deals and passing them through Congress. He's just coming to a deal with the country and then announcing the deal in his attacks on universities. He's not pushed a comprehensive higher ed reform through the House and the Senate. He is coming to individual deals with individual universities. Yuval Levin, the conservative intellectual, who I'm sure you know, his is a line that I like where he says that Trump governs retail, not wholesale. And I think there's real truth to that. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, Obama's deal with Iran, I believe, was done in a, in a similar way. It was just, you go and you bargain with the leaders and you come back and here's the deal. I don't think that was ever ratified as a, as a treaty, you know. So Trump is not alone in that, but I think that the instance you mentioned of the, of the universities, he really got a lot of results out of that a year ago, but I think that that strategy is really reaching its limits. I mean, I think the universities that have stood up to him have fared fairly well. But I also think one reason it's appealing to Trump is that it allows him to act as opposed to having to wait on all these other institutions to act. I mean, you, you sort of frame the broader state, what can get called the deep state, as its issue is that it is undemocratic, whereas I think Trump's issue with it is that it is restraining flow. I mean, I wrote a book called Abundance, which is very much about the way this kind of state often holds Democrats back from doing things because they get caught up in proceduralism that they themselves might even support, but they still are not getting what they want done. And I think you see this tendency with Trump quite a bit. After the, the sort of 12-day bombing of Iran last summer, when he was getting criticized from kind of some of these figures we've been talking about in MAGA, he said, well, considering that I'm the one that developed America first and considering that the term wasn't used until I came along, I think I'm the one that decides that, that being what it actually means. And I think Trump's tendency to not want to have like complex frameworks around him instead to just be the decider himself, on the one hand does not feel like, I mean, and I think you're agreeing with this, a democratic restoration to me. And on the other hand, feels very intrinsic to who he is and who he has been. Yes. I think that when Trump brought the United States into that war, it seems like nothing now. And the United States was famously, the United States was only in that war for 40 minutes, you know. But none of us, or at least certainly not me, I, I don't assume that you can enter a war and then get out at will. I think that's why you don't go into a war because they're really, really much more complex to get out of than anyone ever thinks. But he ended that war and said, okay, we're done. We're done. And, and it seemed like a kind of a magical thing, you know, if he hadn't been able to do that, we could have had this whole conversation a year ago, but he was able to do that. The worrisome thing though, at the time was that was the second episode where he made the whole decision for the whole world himself, but it was really an illusion that that decision was in all in his hands, because at that moment, at that end of 12 days, Israel was kind of reaching the point that it's reaching now, where it seems to be, if it's not running out of anti-rocket suppressant, you know, ammunition, it's at least conserving them. And so it's getting very vulnerable to Iranian attacks. And so they could have kept going if someone had been of a mind to. And I think the same is true of the Chinese with the liberation day tariffs. The threat to cut off its trade of rare earths with us was really perceived as quite a grave threat in Washington. It's nothing you'd want to try if you weren't a hundred percent sure it was going to work. And so that was the worrisome thing about Trump in 2025, that he was, he was a little bit overconfident in his ability to do this kind of unilateral governing without placing the country's fate in someone else's hands. I think this gets to a sort of philosophically quite complicated place, which is I take seriously the conservative critique and sometimes the liberal critique that the administrative state comes at some cost of democratic oversight. And on the other hand, the world operates at a sufficient level of complexity and vastness that it is hard to imagine how you would effectively apprehend it without these deep reservoirs of experience that persist across administrations that are not meant to be wholly political and whose, you know, advice is partially there and whose procedures are partially there to keep presidents and countries from getting into trouble they did not necessarily want to be in. Yeah. And there is a certain tendency to take things for granted. If they persist for too long, there's a tendency to take them as laws of nature. Like we sort of thought that this expertise was something that was inherent in American government and it's inherent in the administrative state part of the government. So is there some part of you that is feeling more warmly towards that state than you were two years ago? I don't think I ever feel totally warmly or totally coldly towards anything. I recognize the virtues of the administrative state, although I share the sense that it had been developed to the point where a lot of ordinary Americans felt that it was maybe futile to try and influence the direction of the state. I mean, I'd seen a round table you did with Chris Rufo and Curtis Yarvin around Dojo. Dojo was ill-defined from the beginning, vaguely defined, certainly, but people latched on particular hopes to Dojo. And you all were hired at that moment on sort of taking the administrative state apart, or at least that's the impression I got. And you said then that efficiency was a necessary smoke screen for Dojo because... The only alternative was to say that this operation is an ideological purge. That's what it was. Which is what it was. That's what it was. And I think that's... It's a much less acceptable story to present to the public than we're saving money. Yeah. I mean, I don't think I said that in any kind of collusive way, but I don't think Dojo was primarily about efficiency. Do you? I mean, I don't think the savings were... I don't think Dojo was about efficiency at all. I don't think the savings were significant. Well, the savings weren't significant. What I understood Dojo as in real time and what I still understand it as now was an effort to break the will of the administrative state to resist Donald Trump, to, I think, Russell talked about it as traumatizing the civil servants. And I understood the arguments that people around Trump made for doing this or feeling that they were slowed down in the first term, that there were things that they were elected to do that they were not able to do. And on the other hand, the way it was done and the ideology behind it came with such a almost dismissal of the idea that there was expertise, procedure, knowledge that was needed and necessary and maybe in fact had stopped terrible things from happening in the first term. And I think we're sort of living through some of the aftermath of that now. I would say just probably the way they primarily looked at it was as sort of a source of permanent political advantage for their opponents as a place where progressives could be parked when Democrats were out of power. And I think that that's the way they looked at it. I'm not sure they had a theory of expertise, but they may well have. Let me ask you, somebody who's done a lot of work on European right-wing movements, how you think Trump and MAGA or the Republican Party under Trump, how it is similar and how it is different to what gets called the populist right in Europe? A sort of mistake we often make here, I think, is to see Trump as a one of one, but there are other movements that have echoes and have predated him and have, you know Exceptions to this, I think, where people are less procedural. Okay. And one is in Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe, you don't, because people didn't have as much control over the political system at all, they haven't acquired the habit of thinking about politics in terms of political procedure the way we have. And the other is among young people. The people who are too young to have like drawn big benefits from just obeying the rules and following the order the way, you know, boomers and Xers did. One thing that struck me about that is that Trump is by his nature very unprocedural. And I know less about the European context than you do, but he's been very straightforward that at least part of his immigration goals is where people come from. He's talked about not wanting people from shithole countries and that, you know, whether Gen X and the boomers are procedural, it has seemed to me that one of the things that many of Trump's supporters at the very least like about him is that he is an answer procedure. I don't think that what appeals to people about him is that they think he is small-d democratic. I think what appeals to people about him is that he just does things and he tells you what he thinks. He doesn't seem to be talking to you in the language of media training or, you know, bureaucracy or the sort of institutional grammar that you hear from both Democrats and Republicans, actually. And in his second term, much more than in his first, that the way he understands it is he's in charge and he's going to do what he thinks is best. And there is, not for all, for some it's repellent, but for others, there is something very compelling about that action-oriented, power-oriented leadership that feels in a very deep way like a throwback to another time. You actually mentioned in, I think it was this piece, a piece about Trump as a kind of Hegelian great man of history. Yes, I mentioned in a tremendous essay by John Judas, who talks about Trump as a historic catalyst. And as a sort of a rupture between orders. Yes. And as a rupture of this kind of liberal institutionalist order into something else. Right. By which he does not mean to say that Trump necessarily knows he's playing this role or understands the transformation he's bringing about. What do you take from that? What do you think he is a rupture into? Oh, goodness gracious. I mean, these are the things that seem to be sometimes forming before our eyes. You know, sometimes you get the impression that that there's an actual shift of power from governments to corporations and things like that. Like there was an article in the Times about how more and more tech companies are producing their own power, right? They're not on the grid. They're sort of like, they're owning a grid. They're taking on yet another attribute of a government. So it's been possible to imagine that, you know, that we're going from states to corporations. So I don't know. Things form and unform, and I don't really see the final version of where we're heading yet. There's another piece that you wrote in 2021, working off of a book by a French political theorist, that I think maybe offers another dimension of this. The argument of that piece was that America and the West were repaganizing. Walk me through some of that argument. I think that was Chantal Delsol's book, which was a very provocative essay. She's a Catholic philosopher, but her basic way of proceeding is, you know, look, we had all these institutions that were built around religion and specifically Christianity and in France specifically Catholicism. They're now being undone. What does this mean to a civilization? She said, well, the best way to look at it is the last time this happened, which is the, when these institutions were being constructed through the undoing of the pagan institutions. And so that was basically a typological comparative history of like, let's say the fourth century AD to the 21st century. And I confess, I forget what I drew from that. I'll read you the paragraph in it. I'm interested in such arguments. I'll read you the paragraph that caught my eye. You wrote, um, Miss Delsol's ingenious approach is to examine the civilizational change underway in light of that last one 1600 years ago. Christians brought what she calls a normative inversion to pagan Rome. That is a prized much that the Romans held in contempt and condemned much that the Romans prized, particularly matters related to sex and family. Today, the Christian overlay on Western cultural life is being removed, revealing a lot of the pagan urges that it covered up. I don't know about the whole, I'll leave scholars of paganism and Christianity to debate if these are the right terms. And I'm not thinking about things 1600 years ago. But to me, that actually describes a lot of what Trump is, this normative inversion of the values that dominated before him. He's this sort of return to this much more highly masculine, patrimonial, the great man takes what he want and grabs what he want and says what he wants and all these sort of post-war institutions and ways of talking and niceties that when he violates them, that's very much part of his appeal. He's this kind of inversion. And every time he violates them, he is proving himself free of them. But to me, one thing about Trump and when he talks about his ability to shoot somebody in Fifth Avenue and not lose his supporters when he says it's sort of, I am MAGA and what I say goes, is I do think part of his appeal is that we have sort of pushed down the, in American politics, you know, the desire for a certain kind of strongman leader. And we've tamed many of those ideas in institutions and rules and this beautiful constitution. And part of what Trump both is able to do and part of his appeal, certainly to his most hardcore supporters, why I don't think they break with him over this issue or that issue, is that he's more about a form of leadership and will and strength and impulse that he is representative of on an almost like mythopoetic level than he is about any kind of individual set of policies. It's interesting that I see where you're going with it. And I think he does like to be strong. He has an idea of strength. I tend not to agree with you that that's what his followers are looking for from him. And I think that it costs him followers slowly but surely. And I think that if you're going to, you know, as Bob Dylan said, you know, to live outside the law, you must be honest. And in fact, to live as a sort of like roving, sort of like man who makes his own rules, you have to have a kind of a code. And so when Trump does things like say what he said about Rob Reiner. A very sad thing happened last night in Hollywood. Rob Reiner, a tortured and struggling but once very talented movie director and comedy star, has passed away together with his wife, Michelle. Reportedly due to the anger he caused others through his massive, unyielding, and incurable affliction with a mind crippling disease known as Trump derangement syndrome. Sometimes referred to as TDS. He was known to have driven people crazy by his raging obsession of President Donald J. Trump with his obvious paranoia reaching new heights as the Trump administration surpassed all goals and expectations of greatness. And with the golden age of America upon us, perhaps like never before. May Rob and Michelle rest in peace. A number of Republicans have denounced your statement on True Social after the murder of Rob Reiner. Do you stand by that post? Well, I wasn't a fan of his at all. He was a deranged person as far as Trump is concerned, he said. Which I actually think might be the hinge moment of his entire presidency. If that's your idea of life and death, if that's your idea of how much respect human life deserves, then the public kind of has to reassess its idea of where it can follow you in matters that involve life and death, including war. And I mean, the fact that he's done this again and again, he did it a second time with Reiner. He did it with Robert Mueller over the past weekend when he died. That's really transgressive. I don't think it's clicking with anybody. But it doesn't seem to cost him much support. And it has always felt like part of him. I remember the things he said about Gold Star families when, you know, one opposed him at the Democratic National Convention talking about John McCain and saying he prefers heroes who weren't captured. I mean that the transgression. Look, I think what Donald Trump says routinely and certainly what he said about Reiner was vicious and repulsive. But I have to admit, I cannot see on a poll that it changed anything for him. But it's so interesting. So why for you is it such a hinge? Because it, I say it's interesting because I have talked to progressive friends about this too, and they don't see it. They just think Trump is saying crazy things all the time. I think this is very different than, you know, the Gold Star family sort of thing had to do with the Democratic National Convention in 2016, where the Democrats brought up a family and they were trying to use the death of this family's son to run down Trump. And it was kind of a political trick, you know, the way the Trump campaign did the same thing with the deaths in the Benghazi consulate in Libya. But that was very different. I think that was just Trump standing up to a political trick. This is actually a kind of an irreverence. Do you know what I mean? So your argument is not so much that these things are hurting him in the polls now, because they're clearly not with his own base in any significant way. I mean, if you look from Rob Reiner to now, his polling Without distorting international trade unduly, and that would probably mean that they would have to return to something like a uniform tariff. I mean, I'm not suggesting this as a policy, but I'm saying that if you had a Trump revival, that would be a big part of it, probably. I think that's a good place to end. Then also a final question. What are three books you'd recommend to the audience? I think everyone should read The Gulag Archipelago. I think that that is such a wonderful book. And this is Alexander Solzhenitsyn. It's the story of his time in the Soviet prison camp, but it's so much more than that. It's three volumes. It's got a history of Russia. It's got a history of the Soviet Union. It's got poetry. It's really a very capacious book in the way that, say, Boswell's Life of Johnson is. Since we're talking about politics, I think if you asked me to name the best political book, it would probably be J. Anthony Lucas's Common Ground, which is a book about busing in Boston, which is kind of the first political event that I have any memory of from being a child. And then I guess if I could recommend a baseball book, a book that really sort of changed the way I, I don't know, look at both sports and writing is Ball Four by Jim Bouton. I don't know if you know that book. I don't. Jim Bouton was a 20-game winner with the Yankees in the early 60s, and he had two great years, won the World Series, blew his arm out. And six years later, he fought and tried to make a comeback. He taught himself the knuckleball, and he came back with an expansion team, the Seattle Pilots, which are now the Milwaukee Brewers. And he kept a diary. And he was a very, very weird guy and kind of an intellectual and an opponent of the Vietnam War. And he sort of wrote about the drugs that the players were taking. It was a very kind of salacious book, but it's a really beautifully written book with a kind of great plot at the heart of it, actually, even though it's just a baseball season diary. Chris Caldwell, thank you very much. Thank you, Ezra. This episode of Ezra Crunch is produced by Jack McCordick. Fact-checking by Michelle Harris with Kate Sinclair and Mary Marge Locker. Our senior audio engineer is Jeff Gelb with additional mixing by Aman Sahota. Our executive producer is Claire Gordon. The show's production team also includes Annie Galvin, Marie Cassione, Marina King, Roland Hu, Kristen Lin, Emma Kelbeck, and Jan Kobel. Original music by Aman Sahota and Pat McCusker. Audience strategy by Christina Similewski and Shannon Busta. The director of New York Times Opinion Audio is Annie-Rose Strasser.